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Notes
EMINENT DOMAIN-RULES OF COMPENSATION
AND THE LIMITED-ACCESS HIGHWAY
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 19561 appropriated money for
the construction of an extensive network of highways throughout
the United States. Under that act the federal government will match
state funds at a 9 to 1 ratio if the states will use the money to construct
highways according to federal specifications. 2 These specifications are
designed to ensure an Interstate Highway System that will carry a
maximum amount of through traffic. 3 In order to accomplish this,
the highways must be built so as to by-pass large urban areas as far
as practicable. 4 Also, the right of access to these highways will be
limited. This means that there will be few, if any, cross-roads, and
little or no right of direct access in abutting land owners.
The acquisition of land for such a vast system of highways necessitates extensive condemnation of private land through the use of the
states' power of eminent domain. The only issue in most of these judicial proceedings will be the amount that must be paid by the state to
the person whose property interest is condemned. One can readily see
that such widespread condemnation of land will place new and
increased significance upon the question of compensation in eminent
domain.
Condemnation of rights-of-way for limited-access highways presents new problems of compensation in addition to the traditional
ones. This is true because often underpasses are not economically feaible, and many existing public and private roads will be blocked.
Serious problems can arise as to when a property owner is entitled
to compensation for the deprivation of his existing right of access to
the public highway system. At this time these problems remain largely
unsolved. Severance damages present another problem. Heretofore,
when an area of land under one ownership was severed by a highway,
the owner could continue to use the severed part simply by going
across the highway. But when access to the highway is limited, the
property owner may be forced to go several miles to get to the severed
170 Stat. 374 (1956), 23 U.S.C. § 151-175 (Supp. V 1958).

270 Stat. 379 (1956), 23 U.S.C. §158 (e) (Supp V 1958).

3 See Levin, "Federal Aspects of the Interstate Highway Program," 88 Neb.
L. Rev. 377, 393-396 (1959).
4See Note, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 106 (1957).

NoTEs
part-if he can get to it at all. The absolute nature of this severance
will often make it the major element of damages.
This note will consider the problems of compensation associated
with the limited-access highway. Its purposes are twofold: (1) to
analyze and discuss the existing rules for compensation in proceedings
to condemn land for highways; and (2) to attempt to apply these
rules to the new problems presented by the limited-access highway.
Basis of Compensation
The power of eminent domain is inherent in sovereignty and does
not depend upon constitutional authority.5 Constitutions have, however, circumscribed that power with limitations." Most state constitutions, 7 as well as the federal constitution s have provisions that prohibit the taking of private property for public use without "just compensation" to the property owner. For example, section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution provides in part:
• . . nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use

• . . without just compensation being previously paid to him. (Em-

phasis added)
Constitutional restrictions prohibit the taking of private property
for anything except public use or public purposes.9 And this is true in
Kentucky. 10 Since condemnation of land for highways is unquestionably for a public use, only two constitutional problems generally
arise in condemnation of rights-of-way. These problems are: (1)
what is a "taking of property" within the meaning of the constitution,
and (2) what is "just compensation" for the property taken.
Generally, a taking of property is any interference or injury to
property or to the rights incidental thereto." This definition includes
the taking or damaging of easements,' 2 and the interfering with riparian rights, 13 as well as the actual taking of areas of land. However, it
does not include damages to property rights resulting from the legitimate exercise of the police power. The exercise of this power is not
considered to be a "taking" and therefore requires no compensation. 14
The limits of the police power are vague and undefined, 15 and it is of5 Jahr, Eminent Domain: Valuation and Procedure § 1 (1953).

0 ibid.

7Note, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 106, 107 (1957).

8 U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
9 Jahr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 6.

1OPerry v. Hill, 275 Ky. 105, 120 S.W.2d 762 (1938).
11 See 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 110 (1941).
12 Id. § 105.
'1 Id. § 107.
14 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 1.42 (3) (3rd ed. 1950).
'5

Jahr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 8.
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ten impossible, in advance of judicial determination, to classify a particular deprivation as a "taking" under the power of eminent domain
or an "interference" in the exercise of the police power.10 Since this
note is primarily concerned with the problem of compensation in the
law of eminent domain, no attempt will be made to accurately define
the limits of the police power.
lust Compensation
1. Fair market value
As previously stated, the taking of private property for public use
requires the payment of "just compensation" to the property owner.
Generally, just compensation is said to be the "fair market value" of the
property taken as of the date of aquisition. 17 Fair market value, in
turn, is usually defined as the value which the property would bring
on the open market between a willing buyer and a willing seller under
ordinary circumstances.' 8 The primary consideration is the actual
sale value of the land, not its value to the taker or to the owner.19
Evidence of value is not restricted to a showing of present use; it
may include evidence of all legitimate uses to which the property is
reasonably adaptable. 20 Thus, an owner may show that his farm near
a city is readily adaptable for subdivision into residential lots, 21 or
one who owns a residence in town may show that his property has

greater value because of its adaptability to business purposes. 22 The
courts, however, are careful to exclude evidence of possible uses which
are found to be so remote and unlikely that they cannot reasonably
23
be said to affect the market value of the land.
Since the concept of fair market value assumes a willing seller and
a willing buyer under ordinary circumstances, evidence of value may
not include forced sale prices,24 or forced purchase prices. 25 And
theoretically, at least, the fair market value of land is not affected
by temporary economic booms or depressions. 26
16 Clarke, "The Limited-Access Highway," 27 Wash. L. Rev. 111, 120

(1952).

17 See Jahr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 66.
18 1d. § 70.
19 Id. H8 68-70.
20 East Kentucky Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W. 2d 535 (Ky.
1958).21
Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R.R. v. Rottering, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1167, 83 S.W.
584 (1904).
22 Kentucky Util. Co. v. Barnett, 252 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1952).
23 1 Orgel, op. cit. supra note 14, § 31.
24 id. §22.
2
5 Id. § 23.
26 Id. §§ 24-25.
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Just compensation, as determined by the fair market value rule, is
not a difficult concept. And if it were applicable as a rule of compensation in all condemnation proceedings, the tasks of the courts and
juries would be greately shnplified. But, as will subsequently be shown,
it is not the only rule of compensation, and in many cases it is not
applicable.
2. Taking of an entire tract
When a public body condemns an entire tract of land, the problem
of compensation is relatively simple-the owner is entitled to the fair
market value of his land.2 7 This single issue will usually be determined
by a jury after hearing evidence of both parties as to the value of the
land.
8. Taking part of a tract of land
When a public body condemns land for highway rights-of-way, it
seldom takes all of a particular tract of land. Generally, only that land
lying within the proposed right-of-way is condemned, and the property
owner is left with some portion of his former area of land. The fair
market value of the portion taken may be nominal, but the taking may
greatly reduce or destroy the value of the remaining land. Courts are
in agreement, in such cases, that it would be unjust to compensate the
owner only for the land taken. 28 Therefore, in partial taking cases,
they have interpreted "just compensation" to include damages to re29
maining land as well as the fair market value of the part taken.
To qualify for damages under this "partial taking" doctrine, a condemnee must meet certain requirements. The first of these is that
there must be a taking of a traditionally cognizable interest in land. 30
The condemnation of a fee, leasehold, or an easement will suffice to
meet this requirement. 31 Secondly, the owner must retain tangible real
estate.3 2 If there is condemnation of an entire tract, there can be no
recovery for damages to a business conducted thereon, or for damages
resulting from the necessity of removing chattels from the land. 33
Thirdly, there must be a physical relationship between the property
interest taken and the land for which resulting damages are claimed. 34
In other words, the complete taking of one separate and distinct tract
27

SeeJahr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 96.

30

See 1 Orgel, op. cit. supra note 14, § 47.

2.S Ibid.
29 Ibid.

City of Ashland v. Price, 318 S.W. 2d 861 (Ky. 1958); see also,
Louisville & E. R.R. v. Hardin, 117 S.W. 381 (Ky. 1909) (leasehold).
31See
32

1 Orgel, op. cit. supra note 14, § 47.

33 Ibid.
34

Ibid.
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of land will not entitle the owner to recover damages to a separate
tract, regardless of the resulting diminution in value.3 5
There are two widely accepted formulas for ascertaining the
amount of compensation in partial taking cases. These are: (a) The
fair market value of the land taken, plus damages to the remaining
land, and (b) the difference in the fair market value of the entire
tract immediately before and immediately after the taking. 36 Kentucky, as will be shown later, appears to use an anomalous hybrid of
these two rules.
(a) The value plus damages rule
In partial taking cases, the majority of jurisdiction hold that the
measure of compensation is the fair market value of the land taken,
plus damages to the remaining land.3 7 On its face, the formula appears
both logically sound and workable, but in practice, it is neither.
Most jurisdictions applying this rule ask the jury to find the
fair market value of the land taken, considering its relation to the entire tract,and then to separately find the damages resulting to the remainder because of the taking of this part.38 It would appear that if a
jury accurately fixed the value of the land taken, with reference to its
relation to the whole, there would be no separate damages to the remainder of the tract. The value of a part with reference to its relation to the whole would by definition include the diminution in value
of the whole resulting from the taking.
This rule of compensation would be sounder if the value of the
part taken were to be fixed without consideration of its position or
value to the entire tract. The jury could then find the damages to the
remainder because of this severance, and the two figures would accurately fix the condemnee's damages. It is extremely doubtful that a
jury could value the part taken with reference to the whole and then
find damages to the remainder without some double recovery. In all
probability such an instruction merely confuses a jury, and they return
a verdict in the total amount that they feel the condemnee should be
awarded. This is done without any attempt to distinguish between the
market value of the part with reference to the whole and the damages
to the remainder resulting from the taking.3 9
35 Ibid.
36

37
38

Id. §§ 50-51.
Id. § 50.

Jahr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 103.

39 See Adams v. Commonwealth ex tel State Highway Comm'n., 285 Ky. 38,

146 S. W.2d 7 (1941). In this case the jury was asked to return separate awards
for the value of the land taken and damages to the remainder. The jury returned

a verdict for a lump sum. The condemnee appealed from this verdict claiming
that the jury did not follow the court's instructions. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument by holding that such a verdict indicated that the jury
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(b) The difference in fair market value rule
A substantial minority of jurisdictions have adopted the difference
in fair market value rule.40 Under this rule, a jury is instructed to
return a verdict in the amount of the difference in the fair market
value of the entire tract immediately before the taking, and the fair
market value of the remainder immediately thereafter. 41
Although this rule is theoretically sound and easier to apply than
the majority rule, it is not without its shortcomings. Some jurisdictions, such as Kentucky, do not permit benefits accruing to the remainder because of the proposed usage of the condemned land to be
set-off against damages. 42 In these jurisdictions it might be difficult for
a jury to determine the value of the land remaining without being
influenced by any benefits which would accrue to it.43 The danger

here, as contrasted with the majority rule, is not double damages, but
rather that the condemnee will recover damages only for his actual
44
loss instead of the amount to which he is legally entitled.
(c) The Kentucky rule (s)
The Kentucky rule for compensation in partial taking cases is unclear, to say the least. The cases reflect at least four distinct verbal
formulas for ascertaining damages, none of which have been expressly
overruled. These rules are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Value of the land taken.
Difference in value before and after taking.
Value of the land taken plus damages to the remainder.
Value of land taken plus damages to remainder, the sum of
which is not to exceed the difference in value before and
after the taking.

The earliest Kentucky cases said that an owner was entitled to recover the value of the land taken, considering its relation to the entire
tract.45 In other words, an owner was entitled to recover the value

found no damages to the remainder. It is doubtful that this was the finding of
the jury. In all probability the jury did not understand the instructions and returned a verdict in the total amount that it though he condemnee should have.
40 1 Orgel, op. cit. supra note 14, § 51.

41

Jahr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 100.

412See discussion of set-off benefits p. 132 infrra.
4310rgel, op. cit. supra note 14, § 64.

44 The condemnee's actual loss is the difference in the fair market value
of the land before and after the taking, considering any benefits accruing because
of the proposed use of the land taken. His legal damages, however, are usually
figured without any regard for any possible benefits.
45See Louisville & N. R.R. v. Asher, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 815, 15 S.W. 517
(1891); Richmond and Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Rogers, 62 Ky. (1
Duv.) 135 (1863); Henderson and N. R.R. v. Dickerson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.)
187 (1856).
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of the land taken from the viewpoint of one who owned the remainder
of the tract.46 In proving the value of the part taken, one could show

all injuries which resulted to the remainder because47of the taking, as
well as the intrinsic value of the condemned land.
In an 1871 case, 48 after stating the above rule, the court explained
that the best way to determine this value, was to determine the difference in market value of the entire tract before and immediately
after the taking. This difference in value rule was later used in a few
cases, 49 but it soon fell into disuse and disappeared from the cases
without being overruled. In 1940, however, it was casually restated in
affirming a judgment,50 and since 1950 it has seemingly been resuscitated.5 '
The majority rule, value of the land taken plus damages to the
remainder of the tract, has not been adopted in Kentucky, but there is
at least one case which applied this rule. 52 This case was not followed,
but it is surprising that it was not in view of the fact that the Court of
Appeals drafted instructions to be used on retrial of the case, and these
5
instructions clearly embodied the majority rule.

3

The rule of damages most often quoted in the Kentucky cases is a
combination of the difference in value and the value plus damages
rules.53 a It is usually stated somewhat as follows (paraphasing):
The defendant (condemnee) is entitled to the value of the land
taken, considering its relation to the entire tract, plus any damages
directly resulting to the remainder of the tract by reason of the
taking. The total award of damages shall not exceed the difference
See Henderson and N. R.R. v. Dickerson, supra note 45.
See cases cited note 45 supra.
Elizabethtown & P. R.R. v. Helm's Heirs, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 681 (1871).
49 See West Virginia, P. & T. R.R. v. Gibson, 94 Ky. 234, 21 S.W. 1055
1893); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Ingram, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 456, 14 S.W. 534
1890); Asher v. Louisville & N. R.R., 87 Ky. 391, 8 S.W. 854 (1888).
SO See Adams v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Highway Comm'n., 285 Ky.
38, 146 S.W.2d 7 (1940).
51 See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 253 S.W.2d 264 (Ky.1952); Commonwealth
v. Crutcher, 240 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. 1951).
52 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Wilson, 165 Ky. 151, 176 S.W. 980 (1915).
53 See id. at 157, 176 S.W. at 983.
53a It is interesting to note the accidental development of this rule. It first
appeared in the case of Louisville, St. L. & T. R.R. v. Barrett, 91 Ky. 497, 16 S.W.
278 (1891). The Commonwealth appealed the case claiming that the instruction
allowed double recovery because of damages for the condemned land and
damages to the remainder. The Court of Appeals held that the instruction did
not allow double damages and affirmed the judgment below. The Court did
not consider the part of the instruction limiting recovery to the difference in
value before and after the taking. Fourteen years later in reversing a judgment
for error in instructions, the Court of Appeals outlined instructions to be given
on retrial, and these instructions included this difference in value limitation.
Big Sandy Ry. v. Dils, 120 Ky. 563, 87 S.W. 310 (1905). A similar instruction
was laid down in the case of Louisville & N. R.R. v. Hall, 143 Ky., 136 S.W.
905 (1911), and it has been more or less consistently followed ever since.
46
47
48
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in the fair market value of the entire tract before and immediately
after the taking.54

This formula, of the four that have been used by the Kentucky
Court, is the least suited to accomplish its purpose of giving the landowner full compensation for his loss and no more. The jury is asked to
find three separate figures: the value of the land taken as a part of
the whole, the amount of damages to the remainder because of the
taking, and the difference in fair market value before and after the
taking. As has been previously pointed out, an accurate fixing of the
value of the land taken, considering its relation to the entire tract,
would necessarily include any damages to the remainder,5 5 and there
should not be any separate damages. Once the evidence warrants
such an instruction, a jury will often be encouraged to find damages,
when in fact there are very little or none resulting from the taking.
It is doubtful that anything is accomplished by the added check of
comparing the total finding of damages to the difference in fair market
value of the land before and after the taking. If a jury does not accurately fix the value of the land taken and damages to the remainder,
it is only a remote possibility that they will accurately fix the difference in value. An instruction framed upon this rule, together with
the usual embellishments,5 6 is enough to discourage the most conscientious jury, and in all probability the jury will end up by returning a verdict in the amount that they think the condemnee should
57
have.
The difference-in-fair-market-value rule is the best of the four
rules. It is simple enough for a jury to understand and it is logically
sound. It provides for full recovery and theoretically eliminates the
possibility of double damages. An instruction based upon this rule
would ask a jury to do three things: (1) find the fair market value of
the entire track before the taking; (2) find the fair market value of
the land not taken; and (3) find the difference in these two values.
Proving the difference in value under this rule would not be
materially different than proving value under the most frequently
used Kentucky rule. The usual opinion evidence would be given as
to the value of the entire tract before the taking. This evidence would
be substantiated by showing all the uses to which the land is reason54 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 50 S.W. 2d 497 (1932);
Producer's Wood Preserving Co. v. Commissioners of Sewerage of Louisville,
227 Ky. 159, 12 S.W.2d 292 (1928); Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co. v. Shanklin, 219 Ky. 279, 292 S.W. 790 (1927).
55 The Court of Appeals has denied this. See Louisville, St. L. & T. R.R.v.
Barrett, 91 Ky. 487, 16 S.W. 278 (1891).
56 See, e.g., Producer's Wood Preserving Co. v. Commissioners of Sewerage
of Louisville, 227 Ky. 159, 12 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1928).
57 See note 38 supra.
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ably adaptable, recent sale prices of this or similar land, or other
factors that would affect or show the market value of the land. The
value after the taking would be substantiated in the same manner.
Although there might be a difference of opinion as to which is the
more logical and sounder rule of damages in partial taking cases, no
one could deny that for purposes of consistency and clarity, only one
formula should be used to express the damages that should be awarded the condemnee. It is therefore hoped, that in the near future, the
Kentucky court will review its past decisions and choose one of the
rules that have been used, and then stick to that rule in future cases. 5r7
4. Set-off benefits
A partial taking for highway purposes is often beneficial to the
remaining land. When a highway is built through a relatively remote
area, the value of the land remaining after the condemnation may be
increased to the point that it becomes greater than the value of the
entire track before the taking. There is no general agreement among the
states as to what extent these benefits may be set-off against damages.58
Some jurisdictions permit the value of the benefits to be set off against
the entire award of damages;5 9 others permit this set-off only to the
extent of the amount of damages to the remainder, 60 while some do
not permit any set-off of benefits against damages. 61
Kentucky holds that "just compensation" for the taking of land
means a payment in money, not benefits. 62 Thus, in Kentucky, there
can be no set-off of benefits against damages resulting because of the
taking. Juries are instructed to find the value of the land taken, and
damages to the remainder, without any consideration of possible enhancement in value of the remainder because of the contemplated
63
usage of the land taken.
However, damages may occur to the remaining land because of
the use to which the taken land is to be put, rather than because of
the taking itself. These damages are called "incidental" or "consequential" damages by the Kentucky Court, 64 while damages resulting be57a The Court took a step in the right direction in Gulf Interstate Gas Co.
v. Garvin, 303 S.W. 2d 260 (Ky. 1957). However, the attempted clarification
fell short of that needed.
58See Jahr, Eminent Domain: Valuation and Procedure § 108 (1953).

69 Ibid.
60 Id. § 109.
61 Id. § 108.
62 Salt River Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Thurman, 275 S.W.2d 780 (Ky.

1955).

63

See Commonwealth v. Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 50 S.W.2d 497 (1932).

64 See East Kentucky Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d 535

(Ky. 1958); Music v. Big Sandy & Ky. R. R.R., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S.W. 44 (1915);
Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Smith, 136 y. 725, 125 S.W. 157 (1910); Big
Sandy Ry. v. Dils, 120 Ky. 563, 87 S.W. 310 (1905).
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cause of the taking are denominated "direct damages," 65 or "actual
damages." 0 The just compensation requirement of payment in money
is held to apply to direct damages. 67 Thus, any damages occuring to
the remaining land because of the use to be made of the land condemned may be off-set by the benefits (increased value) accruing
the benefits are capable of being
to the remainder, at least where
8
money.
of
terms
estimated in
The question of possible set-off benefits will not often occur in
condemnations for limited-access highways, since generally no benefits to the remaining land can be attributed to the building of the highway. The problem can arise, however, where part of the land not
taken abuts on an approach road, for the remaining land obviously
becomes more valuable for business purposes.
Special Problems of CompensationArising Out of Condemnations
For Limited-Access Highways
The limited-access highway brings with it into the law of eminent
domain some new and troublesome problems of compensation. These
problems naturally revolve around the fact that access to these highways will be limited. In general, they may be denominated problems
of existing rights of access and problems of severance damages. Some
of these will be set out and discussed below, and an attempt will be
made to apply the existing rules of compensation to these new situations.
Due to the fact that the limited-access highway is a relatively new
innovation in road building, there is at this time little case law on
condemnation of land for such highways. Therefore parts of the following discussion will necessarily be somewhat speculative.
1. Problems of right of access
a. In general
Any new major highway necessarily crosses numerous other highways and other smaller public and private roads. When an ordinary
65 See Big Sandy Ry. v. Dils and Music v. Big Sandy & Ky. R. R.R., supra

note 63.
667 See Commonwealth v. Powell, 258 Ky. 131, 79 S.W.2d 411 (1935).
6 Music v. Big Sandy & Ky. R. R.R., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S.W. 44 (1915).
See also East Kentucky Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d 535
(Ky. 1958). Ky. Rev. Stat. § 177.085 seemingly allows benefits to be set-off
against any damages to the remainder. The statute does this by consolidating
direct damages to the remainder (those resulting from the taking alone) with
incidental damages (those resulting from the use to be made of the taken land)
and then subtracting any benefits. A similar statute was held unconstitutional in

Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Smith, 136 Ky. 725, 125 S.W. 157 (1910).
0SEast Kentucky Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d
535 (Ky. 1958).
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(non limited-access) highway is built across other highways and roads,
an intersection is usually formed, and traffic, relatively unimpeded,
continues to use the older roads. When a limited-access highway crosses another highway or road, there are three possible courses of action:
(a) an interchange can be built, giving access to the new highway;
(b) an underpass or overpass can be constructed, permitting traffic
to travel unimpeded along the older road, but without any access
to the new highway; and (c) the older road can be blocked. The latter course of action is the one which concerns us here.
When the plans for an interstate highway do not provide for an
interchange and when economic or terrain factors preclude the construction of an underpass or overpass, existing roads will be blocked at
the point where they intersect the right of way lines of a limited-access
highway. The blocking of any existing road is likely to work a hardship
on some property owners using that road. The degree of hardship depends, of course, upon the location of the land in reference to the point
at which the road is closed. If a property owner's sole means of ingressegress is extinguished by the closing of a road, his land may be' rendered almost worthless. If an alternate route exists, the damage to the
value of the land because of the closing of the road wil be directly
proportional to the circuity of the alternate route-the greater the distance to town or the primary place of business, the greater the reduction in the value of the land. It can readily be seen that there are as
many possible degrees of damage as there are different tracts of land

abutting on any road that is closed.
There is no simple and clear cut rule which can be used to determine when a property owner can recover for the blocking of an access route. There are, however, certain factors which are important in
determining whether or not he can recover. Some of these factors are
discussed below.
The courts seem to agree that one who owns land abutting a highway has an easement of ingress and egress in that highway. 69 Although this easement is a property right and may not be taken without compensation to the owner,70 it is subject to reasonable regulation
through the exercise of the police power.71 One factor, then, in determining whether the blocking of a road will give rise to damages is
presence or absence of such interference with the easement as to
amount to a taking, rather than a regulation through the use of the
See Jabr, op. cit. supra note 57, § 42.
70 ibid.
71 Clarke, "The Limited-Across Highway", 27 Wash. L. Rev. 111, 119-122
(1952).
69

NoTEs
police power. In general, if there is no "taking," there is no compensable injury. 2
An important element in determining whether there is a taking is
the presence or absence of service roads. 73 Service roads are those
built to carry traffic previously carried by a road which is closed or
converted into a limited-access highway. Although these roads generally are more circuitous than the existing ones, they provide a means
of ingress and egress. As of yet, only a few courts have considered the
question of service roads and their affect upon any possible recovery
for loss of existing access routes. These courts are not in accord. A
New York court has denied recovery where a service road was supplied. 74 The reasoning of this court was that there was only a general
right of access to the public highways, and not a specific right in a
specific road. On the other hand, the highest court of Washington has
reached the opposite result, and has held that there may be damages
whenever an existing access route is lost, regardless of the presence or
absence of a service road.75 California also seems to agree that there
76
may be damages even though a service road is built.
Recovery for loss of an existing access route, when a service road
is built, will generally depend upon whether the jurisdiction conceives
of the easement of access as a specific right in a certain road or a
general right of access to the public highways. If it is held to be a
specific easement, any unreasonable interference will constitute a
taking and will be compensable. If, however, the easement is held
to be general, damages will probably not be recoverable if a service
road is provided. This is true because in the first instance the owner
lost a property right when he lost the specific easement. In the latter,
he still has his easement, and has suffered only inconvenience. Mere
inconvenience and circuity of route occasioned by the new access
road are not sufficient to constitute a taking. 77 These damages are
said to be similar in kind to those suffered by the public at large. 78 The
only difference is held to be in the degree of the injury.79 A taking occurs when the courts find that the property owner suffers special dam72
See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain § 3 (2d ed.
1953).
73 See Note, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 106, 115 (1957).
74 Gilmore v. State, 208 Misc. 427, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
75 State v. Ward, 41 Wash.2d 794, 252 P.2d 279 (1953).
7 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 890, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).
77

Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117 (1947); see Covey,
"Control of Highway Access", 88 Neb. L. Rev. 407, 418 (1959).
78 SeWright v. Flood, .supra note 77; Langley Shopping Centers, Inc. v.
State7 Road
Conim'n., 213 Md. 280, 131 A.2d 690 (1957).
9
Commonwealth v. Department of Highways, 291 S.W.2d 814 (Ky.

1956); Langley Shopping Centers, Inc. v. State Road Commn, supra note 78.
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ages, different in kind from those sustained by the general public. 0
When several tracts of land are affected by the closing of a road, a
state will build service roads in order to hold down expenses. This
is especially true when an existing road is converted into a limitedaccess highway, for without the presence of a service road, a state
would often be forced to respond in damages approaching the full
value of each tract of land abutting on the road.
Another important factor to be considered in determining whether
an interference with a right of access is compensable is whether or
not other parts of the owner's land are taken. When physical areas
of the tract are condemned, some states will permit recovery for
"incidental damages" consisting only of inconvenience,"' even though
interference alone does not amount to a taking. Thus, an owner's recovery for interference with his right of ingress and egress may well
depend upon the position of his land with reference to the new highway. The only possible justification for this rule is that the owner whose
land is being taken must be brought into court, whereas one who only
has a private easement in a public road may not be. If the rule was
otherwise, a state would be faced with numerous suits for damages
under the theory of "reverse eminent domain."8 1
b. In Kentucky
Although it is well settled in Kentucky that a property owner has an
easement of access in an abutting public road, 2 the Kentucky law as
to when a property owner can recover compensation for the deprivation of this easement is not altogether clear. In the last case considering
the question, Dep't of Highways v. Jackson,83 the Court of Appeals apparently made an attempt to clarify the law on the subject and to formulate a workable rule. In that case, the court said that one who owns
property abutting on a public highway has an easement of "reasonable
access" to the public highway system, and that he could not be deprived of this right without just compensation. In other words, there is
a taking of property whenever the blocking of a public road deprives
a property owner of reasonable access to the public highways of Kentucky.
In general, the rule is sound, but it may cause hardship when the
80
See Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.
1956); Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117 (1947).

81See Cranley v. Boyd County, 266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W.2d 737 (1986); State
v. Meyers, 292 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App. 1956); see also State v. Lynch, 297

S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1956).

81a For a discussion of "reverse eminent domain" see Lewis and Oberst,
"Claims Against the State of Kentucky-Reverse Eminent Domain," 42 Ky. L. J.
163 (1954);
Note, 47 Ky. L. J. 215 (1959).
82
Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1956).

83 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957).
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property affected is used for certain business purposes. In the case of
non-business property, the land will ordinarily not be greatly devalued
unless the access route taken is the only reasonable one. Thus, owners
sustaining extensive loss in the value of their property can recover,
while those whose property value is only slightly affected cannot. As
long as there is a reasonable means of access available, inconvenience
and circuity of route will not be compensable injuries.
When the property affected by the blocking of a road is used for
certain business purposes, the "reasonable access" rule is not entirely
satisfactory, but it is consistent with existing law. The property owner
may suffer severe damages and be unable to recover. This is especially
true when the business is dependent upon a flow of traffic. For example,
the blocking of a road would greatly diminish the value of any nearby
abutting property which is used as a service station, but the access
route left open may be reasonable, and the owner cannot recover. This
result may not be too unreasonable in view of the fact that the damage
results from the lack of through traffic, not from a lack of access to the
property. The same damages would probably occur if traffic was routed
around the particular tract of land, or if the road was not kept in repair. It is clear that the injury would not be compensable in either
of these instances.8 4
Through the "reasonable access" rule of the Jackson case, the court
seemingly conceives of the easement of access as a general easement,
and not an easement in a specific road.85 In so doing, it apparently answers questions arising when service roads are constructed. If a service
road affording reasonable access were constructed, the property owner
would be unable to recover damages under the rule. Whether this will
be the court's interpretation and application of the rule remains to be
seen; however, the last case directly considering the question, Cranley
v. Boyd County,' held otherwise. In that case the court considered the
easement of access as an easement in a specific road, and permitted a
property owner to recover damages resulting from the closing of an
abutting road despite the fact that another road affording reasonable
access had been constructed. Evidence of the existence of the new
so far as it reduced the damages
road was said to be relevant only in
87
caused by the loss of the easement.
84 See Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117 (1947); Cranley v.
Boyd County, 266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W.2d 737 (1936).
85 If the easement of access were in a specific road, the closing of that
road would be a taking of property and compensable. If there is no compensable
injury when the property owner is left a reasonable means of access to his property, his easement of access must be general, and not at any specific point or
in any specific road.
80266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W.2d 737 (1936).
87 Id. at 575, 99 S.W.2d at 741.
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Although Cranley v. Boyd County has neither been overruled or
distinguished as to the point in question, the Court of Appeals probably
will not follow that decision. The case came before the development
of limited-access highways, and to follow it would permit endless
suits to recover damages against the Commonwealth. The cost
of closing an existing road would become prohibitive, if every person
using that road as a means of access to his property were permitted to
recover damages. The Cranley case recognized this possibility, and dictum in that case restricted recovery to persons having property adjacent to the road at the point it was blocked. However, subsequent
cases have disavowed this dictum, leaving the specific easement concept intact without any restrictions.8 This concept is unworkable
today, and in all probability, the court will overrule the Cranley case
when the occasion arises.
Another vexing problem in the taking of easement of ingress and
egress is the time when payment must be made to the property owners.
Undoubtedly, if property other than an easement of access is taken,
compensation must precede entry upon the land.8 9 But payment may
not have to precede entry when only the easement of access is taken. In
Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth,"0 the Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's refusal to grant an injunction to prevent the closing of a road, even though it was the sole means of ingress and agress
of some of the plaintiffs. The Court held that the nature of the public
interest involved overrode the private property interests, and intimated
that an action for damages would be sufficient remedy. This decision
is difficult to reconcile with section 1891 of the Kentucky Constitution,
but it does not appear that the plaintiffs presented the constitutional
argument in this case. It will undoubtedly be presented in the future.
If, as intimated in the Standiford case, some of the plaintiffs were
entitled to damages, the court appears to be in error. If damages were
recoverable, there must have been a taking of an easement of access.
Since an easement of access is property,92 it cannot be taken without
93
"compensation being previously paid" to the owner.
The court was manifestly swayed by the nature of the public interest involved. The building of an interstate highway would be unreasonably hampered, and considerably more expensive if the state were
88 See Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957); Standiford
Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1956).
89 Sec. 13 of the Ky. Const. provides:

. . . nor shall any man's property be

taken or applied to public use without just compensation being previously paid
to him."
90 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1956).

91 See note 89 supra.
92See Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.
1956).
93 See section 13 of Ky. Const., note 89 supra.
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forced to condemn every easement of access taken. There is no reason
why the remedy of damages, after the closing of the road, would not
be sufficient; nevertheless, the constitutional prohibition is present, and
it is difficult to see how it will be circumvented when the issue is
squarely presented to the court.
2. Severance Damages
The condemnation of a right-of-way for any new highway inevitably results in the division of single tracts of land into two or more
tracts. Often such a division produces a diminution in the total value
of the resulting tracts, in addition to the loss for the land taken. This
diminution in value is called severance damage.
Severance damage obviously is not new to the law of eminent domain, or peculiar to the limited-access highway. Such highways do,
however, vastly increase the importance of this element of damages.
The building of an ordinary road through a farm will usually give rise
to some severance damage, but generally the damage is not extensive,
since the farmer can continue to use the farm as a unit. The same is
not true when a limited-access road bisects a farm. Unless the farmer
is provided with an underpass, the severance will be absolute, and the
farm ordinarily can no longer be operated as a unit. The resulting loss
in market value may be many times the value of the land actually
taken. A dairy farm, for example, may be divided in such a manner as
to leave a milk barn on one side of the road and pasture on the other.
Or perhaps, a farm residence may be separated from fields that must
be tended daily. Whenever severances such as these occur, the loss in
value will unquestionably be great. In fact, the major part of the damages will probably be severance damage.
Severance damages come within the ordinary rules of compensation. This is true regardless of which rule the jurisdiction happens to
apply. In those jurisdictions applying the value plus damages rule, the
severance damage is probably included in the damages to the remainder. In jurisdictions which apply the difference in market value
rule, the loss of value resulting from the severance will be directly reflected in the value of the land immediately after the taking.
Although severance damages present no problem in so far as the
rules of compensation are concerned, the increase in this element of
damages does present problems of proof. This is especially true in Kentucky for the Court of Appeals will not hestitate to reverse an award
as being excessive when the record does not contain adequate proof
of damages.94 Thus, when severance damages constitute a major por94 See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Teater, 252 S.W.2d 674 (Ky.
(1952); Southern Ry. v. Gaines, 238 S.W. 2d 165 (Ky. 1951); Tennessee Gas
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tion of the condemnee's claim, he must clearly point up these damages
through every means available. Otherwise, on appeal, the award may
appear excessive because of the great disparity between the value of
the land taken and the damages given.
Conclusion
The widespread condemnation of land in acquiring rights-of-way
for the Interstate Highway System has brought new and concentrated
attention to the law of eminent domain. The rapid increase in the number of cases, and the new problems presented by these cases, have
pointed up the need for a clarification and modernization of the law on
the subject. Some of the older concepts, such as specific easements of
access in public roads, will have to be abandoned; others need to be
modified or clarified.
The Kentucky Court urgently needs to undertake such a redefinition. It needs to abandon the present cumbersome and unsound rule of
damages; it needs to clearly abandon the specific easement concept of
the Cranley case; and it needs to expand and clarify the "reasonable
access" concept of the Jackson case.
After such a re-definition, the court would have some workable general rules by which cases could be decided, and there would be no
need for the case to case improvising that has frequently characterized
the past Kentucky decisions in the field of eminent domain.
Carl R. Clontz
Transmission Co. v. Million, 314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W. 2d 152 (1950); Petroleum
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